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ABSTRACT: This paper examines the argumentation strategy prolepsis: anticipating and subsequently
responding to an argument before it has been made. Although prolepsis is common to a variety of
arguments, it seems insufficiently studied or understood—or, worse, misunderstood as simply a “feint.”
Drawing on scholarship in rhetorical theory and cognitive and social psychology, I offer a new
understanding of prolepsis, recognizing the technique’s potential in argumentative discourse—especially in
the search for “common ground.”
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INTRODUCTION
Our first reading today comes to us from Paul, in the 1st Corinthians, chapter 15, lines 3537. Discussing the doctrine of Christ’s resurrection, Paul asks, “But some man will say,
How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?” Paul then responds,
“Thou fool, that which sowest is not quickened, except it die: And that which thou
sowest, thou sowest not that body shall be, but bare grain, it may chance wheat, or of
some other grain.”
Thus we have an example of prolepsis, understood in this paper as “the
anticipation of and answering of an argument before it has been made” (Trail 2000, p.
144). As I consider the functions and effects of prolepsis, I shall first review both
classical and recent scholarship on prolepsis. Next, I argue that although prolepsis is a
commonly-used strategy in a variety of arguments, it is, in contemporary times,
insufficiently studied or understood—or, worse, misunderstood as simply a “feint.” I will
also examine a brief selection of prolepses. Finally, drawing on scholarship in rhetorical
and composition theory and cognitive and social psychology, I will offer a new
understanding of prolepsis, one that recognizes the strategy’s potential in argumentative
discourse—especially in the search for “common ground.”
CLASSICAL RHETORIC AND PROLEPSIS
According to Richard Lanham, in A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, one of the earliest
mentions of prolepsis, of “anticipations of arguments,” is in the Rhetorica ad
Alexandrum, a work that dates back to the time of Aristotle and is often attributed (rightly
or wrongly) to him (Lanham 1991, p. 121). There, prolepsis is briefly discussed as
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“procatalepsis,” but Lanham offers that prolepsis is the preferred term, in part because it
is “shorter and better known” (p.121).
A more comprehensive classical discussion of prolepsis comes to us from the
Roman rhetorician Quintillian. In Book IV of his Institutes of Oratory, Quintillian
comments on prolepsis at length. While advising orators on how to render judges
“attentive,” he remarks,
A little pleasantry, too, seasonably introduced, refreshes the minds of the judges, and gratification,
from whatever quarter produced, relieves the tedium of listening. Nor is the art of anticipating
what is likely to be said against us without its use, as Cicero says that he knew some had expressed
surprise that he, who had for so many years defended many but prosecuted none, should now
appear as the accuser of Verres, and then shows that the accusation of Verres is a defense of the
allies. This rhetorical artifice is called prolepsis or “anticipation.” As it is useful at times, it is now
almost constantly adopted by some declaimers, who think that they must never begin but with
something contrary to their real object. (emphasis added, IV.i.49-50)

Later, in Book IX, Quintillian again considers prolepsis at some length. This time,
although in Book IV he had implicitly cautioned against the overuse of prolepsis,
Quintillian’s esteem for the strategy is clear. He remarks,
But what has a wonderful effect in pleadings is anticipation, which is called by the Greeks . . .
prolepsis . . . and by which we prevent objections that may be brought against us. It is used, not
sparingly, in other parts of a speech, but is of the greatest effect in the exordium. (IX.ii.16).

Perhaps more significant than Quintillian’s mention of the “wonderful effect” is his
subsequent, and somewhat lengthy, breakdown of various types of prolepses:
Though there is in reality but one kind of it, it includes several species, for there is praemunitio,
“precaution,” as in the speech of Cicero against Quintus Caecilius, when he premises that “having
always before defended, he is now proceeding to accuse”; there is a sort of confession, as that of
Cicero, in his pleading for Rabirius Posthumus, whom he acknowledges to be blamable in his
opinion, “for having entrusted money to king Ptolemy”; there is a sort of prefatory statement, as,
“I will say, not for the purpose of aggravating the charge,” etc. There is a kind of self-correction,
as, “I entreat you to pardon me if I have gone too far”; and there is also, what is very frequent, a
species of preparation, when we state at some length either why we are going to do something or
why we have done it. The force or propriety of a word, too, is sometimes established by prolepsis,
as, “Though that was not the punishment, but the prohibition, of crime,” or by correction, as,
“Citizens, citizens, I say, if I may call them by that name.” (IX.ii.17-18)

Twelve books comprise Quintillian’s Institutes of Oratory, and the work has been rightly
described as “an exhaustive encyclopedia of Roman educational practices that has been
treasured for centuries by Western scholars for both its scope and depth” (Honeycutt,
2007). So, perhaps my argument that the amount of space Quintillian devotes to
prolepsis is indicative of his esteem for the strategy itself is a weak tack. Nevertheless, I
do believe it is significant that such a towering figure as Quintillian—whom Hugh Blair
called “the most instructive and most useful” author on rhetoric in antiquity (qtd. in
Honeycutt, 2007)—would not only consider prolepsis at such length but would also break
down the strategy into several species or varieties. Certainly the strategy merits the
attention of argumentation scholars and theorists.
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CONTEMPORARY DISCUSSIONS OF PROLEPSIS
Curiously, however, contemporary scholars of rhetoric and argumentation seem to have
overlooked, to some extent, the significance of prolepsis. Before I examine this
phenomenon further, however, allow me to comment, briefly, on why I am moving
forward 2,000 years in my survey of rhetorical and argumentation theory as I examine the
place of prolepsis in such scholarship.
As has been well documented in various histories of rhetoric, between the fall of
Rome and the Renaissance, the study of rhetoric was confined, by and large, “to the study
of style and the declamatory rhetoric of the Second Sophistic” (Bizzell and Herzberg
1990, p. 367). Thus, because prolepsis is not primarily a stylistic device, it seems
reasonable to assume that few scholars in the middle ages or even the 17th or 18th
centuries would turn their attention to the strategy. To my knowledge, extensive (or
perhaps even cursory?) discussions of prolepsis do not appear in rhetorical texts until the
20th century. I am not suggesting, of course, that arguers themselves did not anticipate
and answer objections in their texts for 2,000-something years; far from it. I am
clarifying, however, that more recent discussions of prolepses are more germane to my
purposes in this paper.
Several contemporary discussions of prolepsis reveal an interesting pattern:
Whereas Quintillian cautioned against its overuse but still noted its potential for
“wonderful” effects, more recent commentators seem to regard the strategy with
somewhat lower esteem or limited regard. Consider Trail’s definition, from Rhetorical
Terms and Concepts: A Contemporary Glossary. Consistent with classical definitions,
Trail first remarks, “Prolepsis is the anticipation of and answering of an argument before
it has been made.” He adds, then, “In writing it is less impressive than in a live situation,
but it remains a powerful tool if it can be handled in such a way as to appear to be a fair
representation of an opposing position” (Trail 2000, p. 144). Though Trail does note that
prolepsis can be “a powerful tool,” it is worth wondering why it is “less impressive” in
writing than it is in a live situation. Trail does not elaborate on this point, but it is a point
I shall return to later in this paper.
In The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca also turn their attention to prolepsis—twice in the text, in fact. While considering
“anticipatory refutation,” the authors remark that when it takes “the form of an objection
to the speaker’s own argument, it can give rise to prolepsis, a figure which has a
definitive argumentative connotation” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 501).
Contrast this conceptualization of prolepsis with the authors’ first mention of prolepsis,
appearing much earlier in their text. In their discussion of “Rhetorical Figures and
Argumentation,” they offer,
If . . . a speaker introduces objections into his sentence in order to answer them himself, we have a
figure of speech, prolepsis, which is simply a feint. These objections may be clearly imaginary,
but it is important for a speaker to show that he had himself foreseen possible objections and taken
them into account. (p. 169)

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s definition is curious, to say the least. Are they
suggesting that any objection the arguer introduces into his own discourse constitutes a
“feint”? If this is the case, why then is it important for the arguer to show that he had seen

3

PATRICK CLAUSS
possible objections and taken them into account? My answer is that introducing (possible
or probable) objections and then answering them is one powerful way arguers can
connect with audiences—more of this below, in “A Writing Teacher’s Perspective.”
In The Uses of Argument, Toulmin does not directly address prolepsis per se, but
the parallels between the figure and his discussion of what he terms a “rebuttal” must be
noted. Take, for instance, Toulmin’s well-known example of Harry and his British
citizenship. With data as “Harry was born in Bermuda,” and a warrant of “A man born in
Bermuda will generally be a British subject,” one can reasonably infer the qualified claim
“So, presumably, Harry is a British subject.” There are instances, however, where the
claim about Harry (or, anyone in a similar situation as Harry) might not be true. Toulmin
leaves room for such instances or exceptions in his schema in two distinct places: one, the
modal qualifier (here, “presumably”), but more importantly for our purposes in the
rebuttal category. Toulmin offers two sample rebuttals: “Unless both his [Harry’s]
parents were aliens” or “Unless he has become a naturalised American” (Toulmin 1958,
p. 102). These last two instances are, according to Toulmin, “conditions of exception”
and “conditions . . . indicating circumstances in which the general authority of the
warrant would have to be set aside” (p. 101).
These conditions of exception seem strikingly similar to prolepses. However,
nowhere in his discussion of rebuttals does Toulmin implicitly recognize a sort of
chronological or “time” element. Is it this element that sets a prolepsis apart from a
rebuttal? When an arguer utilizes a prolepsis, she does so before the audience has the
chance to offer the objection, the qualification, or the counterargument. She anticipates
these things prior to the audience members offering them up themselves. It is worth
noting here, for instance, that when Lanham defines prolepsis as “foreseeing and
forestalling objections in various ways,” he also notes that the figure is related to
procatalepsis, “a seizing in advance” (Lanham 1991, pp. 120, 119). Although I am not
comfortable with the war or fighting metaphor inherent in the term “seizing,” I do think
the time element inherent in the figure matters a great deal: first this (the anticipation of
the counterargument), and then that (the response). Since Toulmin does not explicitly
recognize this sequential nature, a rebuttal could seemingly be offered anywhere in the
micro-argument or schema. (Or, perhaps the rebuttal could even be offered by the
audience rather than the arguer?)
Or, is the issue more complicated than this? For instance, in relation to the
argument about Harry and his citizenship, could the sample rebuttals simply be a species
or variant of prolepsis? Consider a scenario such as the following: Two friends are
discussing a mutual acquaintance, Harry, trying to discern his citizenship. One participant
in the dialogue—while offering that Harry is a British citizen (claim) because Harry was
born in Bermuda (data)—realizes that the other participant may very well challenge that
claim. (In oral communication, such as this example, body language cues—eye contact
for instance, or a furrowed brow—most certainly affect, among other things, the contents
and direction of the discourse.) As the first participant realizes this, as the first participant
anticipates a possible objection of “Well, Harry could be a naturalized American,” that
participant subsequently includes the objection in his argument. That objection is not
necessarily or directly addressed, but is it primarily the anticipation of the
counterargument, and not also the direct answering thereof, that makes a prolepsis? That
is, what exactly constitutes a prolepsis? Does an argument need to explicitly include both
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the anticipation of the counterargument and the subsequent response to said
counterargument to be a prolepsis? For instance, in the Toulmin/Harry’s citizenship
example, would the arguer need to include not only “Unless Harry is a naturalised
American,” (the anticipation of counterargument) but also a clause along the lines of
“which is definitely not the case” (the subsequent response) to make that a prolepsis?
Additionally, would the arguer need to mark the forthcoming prolepsis with a clause such
as “You may be thinking . . . ” or “Perhaps you’re wondering . . . ”? My contention is no,
not necessarily. All of these elements do not need to be explicitly included to make a
prolepsis. Such a definition or distinction seems much too rigid, for of the various
elements (including the anticipation of the counterargument, and the answering of that
counterargument) it seems that the anticipation is what matters most.
Though Toulmin does not directly address prolepsis, a more recent argumentation
scholar, Tindale, includes an extended discussion of prolepsis is his Rhetorical
Argumentation. Trail identifies prolepsis as “less impressive” in writing than in speech
(Trail 2000, p. 144), and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca caution against prolepsis when
it functions simply as “a feint” (1969, p. 169). Tindale, on the contrary, seeks to restore
prolepsis to its rightful place in argumentation scholarship. (A distinction Tindale raises
in his “Preface” is worth noting here: About various approaches to the study of argument,
Tindale explains that the approach he emphasizes in his book “stress[es] the process
involved in the argumentative exchanges between arguers and audiences” (as opposed to
those approaches that emphasize “the logical product” and “those that investigate the
procedures involved in argumentative exchanges” (emphasis added, Tindale 2004, p. xi).)
Tindale offers a traditional definition of the term, “the anticipation of objections
to one’s position and preemptive response to those objections” (p. 83). However, unlike
other contemporary commentators, Tindale also argues that the figure’s
significance lies in its importance to dialectical argumentation, models of which will often require
something very like prolepsis in the procedural rules (or dialectical obligations) it proposes for
good argumentation. (p. 83)

Even better for our purposes here, Tindale then offers an extensive explanation of his
summative claim about prolepsis: “So there is much to recommend prolepsis as an
argument” (p. 85). For instance, as he examines a recent argument (from 2002) about the
killing of Palestinians by Israelis—and, by extension, the culpability of American
citizens—Tindale uncovers not only an extended analogy in the argument but also an
extended use of prolepsis. He explains
The point is made by a series of objections and counters to those objections. This is not just the
strategy of counter-argumentation that many theorists already promote in any arguer’s repertoire;
this is countering of imagined objections, and so success depends to a large extent on the quality
of the appropriateness of such imaginings. Once again, the audience is able to “experience” the
reasoning insofar as prolepsis presents to the mind the semblance of an exchange into which that
audience enters. In a similar way, it invites collaboration. . . . Again, like other figures, successful
use of this also has an ethotic payoff, since using prolepsis gives the argumentation an air of
objectivity, shows the arguer trying to conceive things from the other point of view and treating
that point of view in a reasonable fashion. (Tindale 2004, pp. 84-85).

Tindale’s commentary is significant for many reasons. Before elaborating further,
however, and before offering my own extension of his regard for the importance of the
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figure in argumentation—especially in regard to what he terms the “ethotic payoff”—I
would like to turn my attention to a variety of prolepses; before elaborating why the
figure is not simply a “feint,” I would like to consider a few representative samples.
(Over the years, I’ve collected perhaps hundreds of examples of prolepses, ones
appearing in a wide variety of texts: advertisements for toothpaste or skin cream;
examples culled from the sports pages, newspaper editorials, and letters to the editor;
political arguments; and arguments about civil rights [e.g., King’s “Letter from a
Birmingham Jail”], just to name a few.)
SAMPLE PROLEPSES
In one of my university courses, a 200-level argumentation and composition class, I offer
students extra-credit if they find a “real-life” example of a prolepsis; soon after that offer,
they begin bringing me newspaper clippings, pages photocopied from their textbooks for
other courses, and magazine ads, for instance. Prolepses are that common and frequently
or easily spotted. (A side note: The frequency with which this figure or strategy appears,
contrasted with the scant attention it seems to have received in argumentation
scholarship, has always puzzled me.)
Several years ago, for instance, a student brought in an advertisement from a
fashion magazine, an advertisement for “Lipoduction Body Perfecting Cream.”
Alongside a picture of a woman’s bare leg against a dark background, the stark white
copy reads, “Sure, it might be the most expensive cellulite cream. But it works 700%
better.” Although neither the student nor I knew the exact or even the approximate cost of
the cream, we both agreed that hyperbole (“the use of exaggerated terms for the purpose
of emphasis or heightened effect” (Corbett 1990, p. 451) was employed in the text.
Nevertheless, we also agreed that prolepsis was also at work: First, the copywriters
anticipate a likely response or reaction by consumers, one along the lines of “Gosh, that
cream is expensive!” or “Who would pay so much for skin cream?” Next, the copywriters
respond with their own counterargument to those anticipated claims. It must be noted,
too, that even though they almost certainly exaggerate the cream’s effectiveness (how
exactly would one gauge “700% better,” by the way? and, better than what?), the
copywriters anticipate a weakness to their own condition, perspective, or position. A
fundamental, implicit claim to almost any product or pitch, it would seem, would be
something along the lines of “our product is a good value” or “our product is worth it.”
Another student shared this example with me, one he found on amazon.com. It is
from a customer’s review of Bruce Dowbiggin’s hockey book, Of Ice and Men: The
reviewer questions Dowbiggin’s skill as a sports writer, for he notes several “factual
errors that any competent editor would have caught.” For instance, the reviewer observes
that “Dowbiggin writes of Clint Malarchuk’s life-threatening injury, but has him playing
for the Washington Capitals.” The reviewer immediately follows this charge with his
prolepsis: “I am being picky, sure, but how do you write about a scene no one ‘will ever
forget,’ and then get the team wrong?!” (emphasis added). As with the cellulite cream
advertisement, here we have a similar (and common) type of prolepsis: the anticipation
and subsequent answering of an argument about the arguer’s own position, perspective,
or stance before the audience has the opportunity to offer that criticism. (And in this
forum—customer reviews of books found on amazon’s website—one certainly can offer
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a criticism or response: all one needs to do is login and write a follow-up post, something
along the lines of “That one guy sure was being picky! So Dowbiggin got Malarchuk’s
team wrong? So what?”)
Two more typical, conventional prolepses, before I turn my attention to prolepses
appearing in perhaps one of the most important political works from the 20th century, Dr.
King’s 1963 “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” Both examples come from a textbook
from a 300-level ethics course one of my students was enrolled in while concurrently
taking my argumentation and composition course. In “Plain Sex,” reprinted in Morality
and Moral Controversies, Alan Goldman turns his attention to sexual desire—or, more
specifically, the causes of sexual desire. Early in his work, he writes
Our definition of sex in terms of the desire for physical contact may appear too narrow in that a
person’s personality, not merely her or his body, may be sexually attractive to another, and in that
looking or conversing in a certain way can be sexual in a given context without bodily contact.
Nevertheless, it is not the contents of one’s thoughts per se that are sexually appealing, but one’s
personality as embodied in certain manners of behavior. Furthermore, if a person is sexually
attracted by another’s personality, he or she will desire not just further conversation, but actual
sexual contact. While looking at or conversing . . . (Goldman 1999, p. 486)

Here, when Goldman proposes, “Our definition of sex . . . may appear too narrow,” he
anticipates a probable or likely objection from his readers, however varied those readers
may be. Goldman subsequently responds to this objection with his own counterargument,
his own defense of his definition. Two markers that seem especially relevant here are
Goldman’s transition “nevertheless,” which signals the forthcoming counterargument to
the anticipated objection, and “furthermore,” which signals the continuation of that
counterargument.
A similar prolepsis appears soon after in Goldman’s text. Addressing the
interrelated functions of love, marriage, and monogamy, he writes, “It can be argued
similarly that monogamous sex strengthens families by restricting and at the same time
guaranteeing an outlet for sexual desire in marriage” (p. 488). The attentive reader of
Goldman’s text realizes, upon seeing the clause “It can be argued . . .,” that in fact
Goldman is not arguing that position, that instead Goldman is anticipating that position as
a likely response on the part of his audience—again, however varied that audience may
be. Consequently, Goldman follows up the anticipated argument with the claim
But there is more force to the argument that recognition of a clear distinction between sex and love
in society would help avoid disastrous marriages which result from adolescent confusion of the
two when sexual desire is mistaken for permanent love. (p. 488)

Goldman’s text, not surprisingly, contains several other prolepses, but King’s skillful
uses of the figure deserve attention.
PROLEPSES IN KING’S “LETTER FROM A BIRMINGHAM JAIL”
The prolepses examined thus far seem to fall into two general categories, and it is these
two general categories, I argue, that constitute the wide varieties of the figure: Again, in
the first category, the arguer anticipates objections to the position being advanced, and
these objections serve as a recognition of one’s own weaknesses. The advertisement for
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Lipoduction Body Perfecting Cream is an example of this type of prolepsis. Recall that
the copy read, “Sure, it might be the most expensive cellulite cream. But it works 700%
better.” So too was the review of Bruce Dowbiggin’s Of Ice and Men, when the reviewer
noted, in relation to his objections to the book’s factual errors, “I am being picky, sure.”
In the second category of prolepses, as in the first, the arguer also anticipates objections
to the position being advanced. However, now these objections relate not to weaknesses
(real or perceived) to the arguer’s position; instead they relate to what I term recognition
of strengths to the other side. The two examples from the Goldman text, especially the
second one, fall into this category. (Recall that in the second, Goldman recognizes the
strength to the alternate or opposing perspective, that monogamous sex strengthens
families, before he advances his own counter-position.)
Not only do we see these two types of prolepses in advertisements, book reviews,
and college textbooks, but we also see them in political texts as well. Such is the case
with Dr. Martin Luther King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” First, though, let me
offer my own prolepsis: King wrote his “Letter” in response to an already-published
argument, the “Statement by Alabama Clergymen,” which appeared in the Birmingham
News in April of 1963. King read this statement in his jail cell on April 12, 1963 (Good
Friday) and subsequently penned his response, his “Letter.”
Thus, in many instances, King is not so much anticipating as-yet-unstated
arguments or objections as he is responding to claims already set forth. Early in the letter,
King writes, for instance, “You deplore the demonstrations taking place in Birmingham.
But your statement, I am sorry to say, fails to express a similar concern for the conditions
that brought about the demonstrations” (p. 1).
Similarly, soon after that, King writes:
One of the basic points in your statement is that the action that I and my associates have taken in
Birmingham is untimely. Some have asked: ‘Why didn’t you give the new city administration time
to act?’ The only answer that I can give to this query is that the new Birmingham administration
must be prodded about as much as the outgoing one, before it will act. (p. 2)

In “The Public Letter as a Rhetorical Form,” Richard Fulkerson has already commented,
somewhat briefly, on King’s use of Rogerian argumentation strategies. Fulkerson
observes, for instance, that throughout the letter King pays “his clerical audience the
compliment of having listened carefully to their views.” So, Fulkerson concludes, “His
essay thus fulfills Carl Rogers’ demand that one must first hear a position and be able to
repeat it with understanding and clarity before real communication can occur” (Fulkerson
1979, p. 132). Also, Fulkerson has commented at some length on the ethos King
establishes in his letter; Fulkerson argues, for instance, that readers (including the
immediately intended audience, the clergymen; and the larger audience, you and me)
would find King “able and honest and worthy of belief” (p. 129) because King “knows
his subject, . . . his audience, . . . and his art” (p. 129). Nevertheless, although many of
King’s arguments in the “Letter” are accurately classified as Rogerian restatements of his
audience’s position—restatements, it must be noted, that King uses to segue into his own
arguments—King’s “Letter” also contains a number of noteworthy and effective
prolepses.
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Consider the definition of a prolepsis in relation to an activity in an argumentation
textbook, Missimer’s Good Arguments: An Introduction to Critical Thinking. In “How to
Create Alternative Arguments,” Missimer advises students to use what she calls “a
wonderful three-part technique for developing a sophisticated argument” (Missimer 1994,
p. 36). She offers that “its ‘point, counterpoint, point’ structure really engages opposing
arguments” (p. 36). First, the arguer makes the strongest case possible for her position.
Next, the arguer offers the strongest reasons possible against her position. Finally, the
arguer takes her first position again, granting the truth of the reasons against it, but then
going on to show how her first position is still better (p. 36).
Does King utilize this “Engulf and Devour” strategy? Perhaps. Consider an
argument near the end of the “Letter,” when King address the clergymen’s praise for the
Birmingham police, the police who have handled the demonstrations, in the clergymen’s
terms, in a “calm manner.” King, however, cannot join the clergymen in their “praise of
the Birmingham police department” (p. 8). He admits that the “police have exercised a
degree of discipline in handing the demonstrators. In this sense they have conducted
themselves rather ‘nonviolently’ in public” (p. 8). However, King “devours” that
position: “But for what purpose?” he asks (p. 8). In other words, why have the police
conducted themselves nonviolently? His answer: “To preserve the evil system of
segregation” (pp. 8-9).
Continuing—that is, in Missimer’s terms, “devouring”—even further, King
affirms that “it is just as wrong, or perhaps even more so, to use moral means to preserve
immoral ends. . . . they have used the moral means of nonviolence to maintain the
immoral end of racial injustice” (p. 9). And ending racial injustice is, of course, King’s
ultimate goal, both in his “Letter” and in his public or professional life.
There are, perhaps, other “engulf and devour” prolepsis examples in King’s
“Letter,” but I have some misgivings about the metaphor: “Devour” seems too close to
“argument as war,” which, as I observed previously in this paper, I am not comfortable
with, especially in relation to King’s rhetorical style and ultimate goals. Someone who
ends his letter with “Yours for the cause of Peace and Brotherhood” (p. 9), for instance, is
arguably not out to “engulf and devour” his opponents’ arguments. Nevertheless,
Missimer’s larger point is perhaps fitting.
More productive, however, is a consideration of several of King’s prolepses vis-àvis the work of a social psychologist. What are, after all, the psychological effects of a
prolepsis? What likely effects, that is, does a prolepsis have on the argument’s audience,
especially their attitude toward both the arguer and the argument? What is the ethotic
payoff, for instance? Recall what Aristotle offers at the very start of Book Two in On
Rhetoric, when he turns his attention to the pisteis, or means of persuasion in public
address: “Since rhetoric . . . exists to affect the giving of decisions . . . the orator must not
only try to make the argument of his speech . . . worthy of belief; he must also make his
own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of
mind (emphasis added, Aristotle 1954).
Levine, in The Power of Persuasion, offers insight. But first, another prolepsis of
my own: To my knowledge, nowhere does Levine directly, specifically address prolepsis.
The figure is not listed in his table of contents or index, and several readings of the text
turn up no specific mention of the term. However, while first reading Levine’s text
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several years ago, I was immediately struck by the parallels between prolepsis and what
Levine calls “The Contrast Principle.” This principle
relies on the fact that human minds magnify differences: When two relatively similar stimuli are
placed next to each other, they’ll be perceived as more different from each other than they actually
are. (Levine 2003, pp. 94-95)

Levine notes two examples: “A loud noise on a quiet night sounds even louder. A cool
breeze on a hot day feels that much cooler” (p. 95). (Comedian George Carlin’s
observation that “anyone who drives slower than you is an idiot but faster than you is a
maniac” comes to mind as yet another example of the Contrast Principle.)
Levine elaborates—and this is the parallel to prolepsis that I noted upon my first
reading—that “social psychologists call this process ‘social comparison.’ Cognitive
psychologists refer to it as ‘framing’” (p. 96). Earlier in the text, Levine examines the
methods used by mentalists, “people who use psychological tricks to imply they possess
special knowledge or powers” (p. 37). When he discusses his own forays into the field—
learning and practicing the techniques mentalists use—Levine reports that he begins by
telling his audience that he can “mentally transport psychic energy” (p. 41). He also
explains to his audience that “most people who make these claims are phonies,” but his
skills are based on “doctoral-level training” (p. 41). Levine does this—tells his audience
most mentalists are phonies—because, as he explains, “Since most of the audience is
skeptical of psychic powers to begin with, this is a good way to defuse their resistance”
(p. 41). In other words, Levine anticipates (from previous experiences, perhaps) that his
audience likely holds this view already. Then he “regains the offensive by offering the
reason why” he, himself, is different (p. 41). Now, while considering King’s uses of
prolepsis, by no means do I mean to suggest that King is a “flim flam artist” like the
mentalists Levine debunks. I do think, however, that Levine’s discussions of “defusing
resistance” and “framing” are relevant in relation to King’s applications of the figure.
For instance, addressing the clergymen’s point that the demonstrations have been
“unwise and untimely,” King takes the clergymen’s argument one step further. He writes
We are sadly mistaken if we feel that the election of Albert Boutwell as mayor will bring the
millennium to Birmingham. While Mr. Boutwell is a much more gentle person than Mr. Connor,
they are both segregationists, dedicated to maintenance of the status quo. I have hope that Mr.
Boutwell will be reasonable enough to see the futility of massive resistance to desegregation. But
he will not see this without pressure from devotees of civil rights. (emphasis added, p. 2)

Nowhere in their letter do the clergymen assert that Mr. Boutwell is much more gentle
than Mr. Conner. Nowhere do they specifically address the character, the ethos, of either
Boutwell or Connor. However, what King does is precisely what happens in many of the
prolepses I’ve studied, ones from texts or sources other than King: When King calls
Albert Boutwell “a much more gentle person,” he anticipates a likely response to his
argument that Boutwell as mayor will not bring an end to racial injustice: One could
charge, for instance, that Boutwell is not the same as Connor, for Boutwell, being more
gentle, will surely work with desegrationists. But King anticipates this response, this
response relating to Boutwell’s and/or Connor’s characters, and by doing so, King, in
part, frames the issue how he wants it framed: in terms of character and its relationship to
the ending of segregation. In other words, “sure, Boutwell, compared to Connor, is
10
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gentle, but not gentle enough to end segregation”—both men are committed to the status
quo, according to King. Additionally, not only does King frame the issue in his terms,
King also defuses some of his audience’s resistance when he explicitly recognizes that
Boutwell is a “gentle man.” King shows his audience that he is able to recognize
Boutwell’s strength, even though this strength is not sufficient enough for King.
King defends the timing of the protests in Birmingham. Immediately after, he
turns his attention to justifying his actions, his choices. He writes, “You may well ask:
‘Why direct action? Why sit-ins, marches and so forth? Isn’t negotiation a better path?’”
(p. 2). Now, to clarify, the clergymen have actually written, “We agree rather with certain
local Negro leadership which has called for honest and open negotiation of racial issues
in our area” (Carpenter, et al 1963, p. 1). So, perhaps this is yet another instance of a
Rogerian response instead of an out-and-out prolepsis/anticipation of an unstated
argument. Notice, however, that the clergymen did not specifically ask “Why direct
action? Why sit-ins, marches, and so forth?” What they had done was support
negotiation, not call for King to clarify his support for direct actions such as sit-ins and
marches. Perhaps I’m quibbling. Perhaps I’m stretching. But, again, Levine’s brief
discussion of cognitive frames seems relevant: First King anticipates that, although the
clergymen have explicitly stated their support for negotiation, these clergymen may, at
the same time, wonder “why engage in direct action?” In other words, King anticipates,
“If we, the clergymen, support X (negotiation), why do you do Y (direct action)? What
are the merits of Y?” Doing so allows King to frame direct action and negotiation
together. He writes,
You are quite right in calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct action.
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community
which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks to so dramatize
the issue that it can no longer be ignored. (p. 2)

Controlling this frame allows King to control the terms of the discourse.
Another way King controls the terms of the discourse in his letter is the ethos he
constructs for himself over the course of the text. Consider, first, what Aristotle argues
about the construction of ethos in the discourse itself. Early in On Rhetoric, Aristotle
observes,
There is persuasion through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the
speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more
quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not
exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous
opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person; for this is not the case, as some of the technical
writers propose in their treatment of the art, that fair-mindedness [epiekeia] on the part of the
speaker makes no contribution to persuasiveness; rather, character is almost, so to speak, the
controlling factor in persuasion. (1991, p. 38)

If a “fair-minded” character is so important—so much so that Aristotle terms it the
“controlling factor”—how does King’s text, especially his use of prolepses, contribute to
or construct such an ethos? One way King does this is through his own admitting to
weaknesses in his own position, real or perceived.
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The admittance of weakness is a type of frame that seems to serve a number of
functions. Each of us carries with us, undoubtedly, our own values, biases, ideas, morals,
etc.—our own affective and cognitive frames, in other words. When we encounter an
argument that conflicts with our existing frames, the argument creates dissonance for us,
and this dissonance is unpleasant. Consequently, it would seem, most people at least
disagree with or at most dismiss the conflicting argument in order to minimize
dissonance. Thus, to minimize this resistance, the arguer must first implicitly honor the
audience’s existing cognitive framework: The arguer must anticipate and admit to or
recognize the perceived weakness, for instance. Next, the arguer must attempt to show
how the new material can be incorporated into the existing frame without undue conflict.
One way to do this, of course, is to “reframe” the issue by overtly admitting to the
weakness and then show how, from a different perspective, said weakness is actually a
strength.
King does this early in his “Letter.” In the spirit of Rogerian argumentation,
responding to the clergymen’s disdain for King’s willingness to break laws, King writes,
“You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to break laws” (p. 3), to which
he answers
This is certainly a legitimate concern. Since we so diligently urge people to obey the Supreme
Court’s decision of 1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools, at first glance it may seem
rather paradoxical for us consciously to break laws. (p. 3)

He continues, though, by clarifying in prolepsis-like fashion: “One may want to ask:
‘How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?’” (p. 3). Certainly,
breaking laws or encouraging others to break laws would cause the staid clergymen
dissonance. Thus, when King answers the prolepsis, he reframes the issue. He writes
The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to
advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws.
Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St.
Augustine that “an unjust law is no law at all.” (p. 3)

King has deftly turned around the weakness—the fact that he advocates breaking the
law—by getting the clergymen to see that St. Augustine (and one can safely assume the
audience not only knows of but also respects St. Augustine) has also addressed the
differences between just and unjust laws. By extension, King “reframes” his breaking of
law with that of Augustine’s dictum that “an unjust law is not law at all.”
The second type of prolepsis reframe relates to how the arguer anticipates and
addresses a perceived weakness, one that may be true in general but either does not apply
in this particular case or is less troublesome than it first appears to be. King demonstrates
this when he addresses the means and ends of nonviolent direct action. He writes,
Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community
which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks to so dramatize
the issue that it can no longer be ignored. (p. 2)

He continues, adding, “My citing the creation of tension as part of the work of the
nonviolent-resister may sound rather shocking. But I must confess that I am not afraid of
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the word ‘tension’” (p. 2). Here, King anticipates and admits to a perceived weakness in
his position, but he demonstrates, then, that this weakness is not as troublesome as it first
appears—either to him or to his audience. King clarifies just what type of tension applies
in this case:
I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension
which is necessary for growth. Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the
mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered
realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, we must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies
to create the kind of tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice
and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood. (p. 2)

This adept reframe allows King to combine his position and goals with the ethos of
Socrates, the philosopher who died for his beliefs, who died knowing that his resistance,
his nonviolent tension, would bring about social change.
Earlier, I argued that it is the anticipatory element to a prolepsis—as opposed to
just or primarily the explicit use of a clause such as “you may be thinking” or “perhaps
you are wondering”—that constitutes a prolepsis. I also argued that one of the main types
of prolepses is when an arguer explicitly recognizes weaknesses to his own position—as
opposed to the other type, where the arguer recognizes strengths to the “other side.”
Consider the first type of prolepsis, when King begins his “Letter” with what may be the
most noteworthy prolepsis of them all. At the very start of his text, he writes, “While
confined here in the Birmingham city jail, I came across your recent statement calling my
present activities ‘unwise and untimely’” (p. 1). Nothing particularly prolepsis-like in
that, of course. But consider what King does immediately after he explicitly recognizes
that his intended audience, the clergymen, have criticized him and his work. He writes,
Seldom do I pause to answer criticism of my work and ideas. If I sought to answer all the
criticisms that cross my desk, my secretaries would have little time for anything other than such
correspondence in the course of the day, and I would have no time for constructive work. (p. 1)

In other words, “Let me begin by admitting weaknesses: You criticize me and my work.
What’s worse, others criticize me and my work—so many, in fact, that if I tried to deal
with all of that criticism, that is all my staff and I would have time for. I would spend all
my time addressing perceived weaknesses that I would get almost nothing else
accomplished.” Certainly, King is exaggerating in a self-deprecating style. As an adept
arguer, however, one who can and will control the terms of the discourse, King
immediately tells his audience, “But since I feel that you are men of genuine good will
and that your criticisms are sincerely set forth, I want to try to answer your statements in
what I hope will be patient and reasonable term” (p. 1).
In many ways, King’s “Letter” can be considered a type of negotiation with his
audience. If so, consider that his admittance of weakness here—his anticipation that such
a move will engender him to his audience—is but one way King builds rapport and
establishes trust with that audience.
More importantly, however—not only with this particular prolepsis from King but
with perhaps all prolepses in general—is the idea of reciprocity. The work of social
psychologist Levine is again relevant. Midway into The Power of Persuasion, Levine
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elaborates on what he and other psychologists call “the reciprocity rule.” Put simply,
“most of us are driven by a sense of equity and fairness,” so
when someone does something for us or gives us something, we feel obligated to do something for
that person in return. . . . [the favor] activates one of the most powerful of social norms, the
reciprocity rule, whereby we feel compelled to repay, in equitable value, what another person has
given to us. (Levine 2003, p. 65)

Levine offers the example of Hare Krishnas at airports, for instance, in the 1960s.
Seeking contributions, the Hare Krishnas would hand passersby free flowers or pin the
flowers on their jackets. Or, in San Diego, “which has a high concentration of military
personnel and retirees,” the Hare Krishnas would pin a small American flag on people’s
jackets (p. 71). The reciprocity rule—a powerful, unspoken rule of social engagement and
social order—told recipients they should give something in return for the “free gift”: a
small donation, most likely. “This gimmick,” Levine explains, “has made the Krishnas a
wealthy organization” (p. 71).
Though Levine characterizes the Hare Krishna’s distribution of flowers or flags as
a “gimmick,” he offers numerous examples of the rule at work in a wide variety of
interpersonal, social, and business settings—too numerous to go into here. He concludes
The reciprocity norm not only allows trade and transactions to proceed in good faith; it lays the
foundation for cooperative, prosocial, unselfish human relationships. It reminds us to balance
giving and receiving, to share. At its best, the norm both induces generosity and provides the
psychological security that our generosity will be returned in due course. (p. 89)

As humans engaged in argument, could such reciprocity be just what we strive for when
we utilize prolepses? When I explicitly recognize good arguments to the other side, for
instance, am I not also implicitly asking my audience (perhaps ones not at all invested in
the other side, perhaps ones heavily invested in the other side) to grant me the same
reciprocity? When King writes, “My citing the creation of tension as part of the work of
the nonviolent-resister may sound rather shocking,” he is, I argue, utilizing a prolepsis:
He is anticipating that his audience will find his citing the creation of tension on the part
of the resister as “rather shocking.” King is, in a way, giving something to his audience.
He grants them that concession, and psychologically, rhetorically, they become—
according to the reciprocity rule—more likely to give him something in return. Perhaps
that something is their undivided attention; perhaps it is agreement on the forthcoming
particular point; perhaps it is agreement with the larger theses King advances.
Nevertheless, here, as in so many other prolepses, the figure functions as a powerful quid
pro quo: “I’ll give you this, if you’ll give me that.” Ethotically, the figure also functions
thus: “I’ll be open and fair-minded if you will as well.”
CONCLUSION: A WRITING TEACHER’S PERSPECTIVE
You’ll recall that Trail, in Rhetorical Terms and Concepts, offers that “Prolepsis is the
anticipation of and answering of an argument before it has been made” (Trail 2000, p.
144). It can be “a powerful tool if it can be handled in such a way as to appear to be a fair
representation of an opposing position” (p. 144). He also notes, however, that “in writing
it is less impressive than in a live situation” (p. 144). I would like to close by taking Trail
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to task on that observation. As a writing teacher first and a rhetorician or argumentation
scholar second, I contend that in writing a prolepsis is often more impressive than it is in
a live situation (such as a conversation).
I shall use this paper as my example: As I write this paper, I sit alone in my
basement home office, books and papers strewn across my desk, my lap, and the floor.
Soon I will send this paper to my commentator, Professor A.F. Snoeck Henkemans; I will
also stand before you one day in June and read most or, time permitting, all of what I
have written. Subsequently, the paper will be, I hope, read by others (on CD-ROM, for
instance). But none of these various audiences is present as I compose and revise. I
cannot turn to any of the audiences and ask, “Did I use sufficient evidence here? Does
this claim seem clear and well-supported?” for instance. Also, I have no access
whatsoever to body language cues, cues which would aid a great deal in my assessment
of my audience’s responses or reactions.
Consequently, as I compose and revise, my attention needs to be focused not only
on the text itself—or, my arguments in the text—but also on what I anticipate my various
audiences’ reactions to be. A proficient writer, in other words, is one who can not only
string together words, phrases, and clauses in such a way as to convey intended meanings
as clearly as possible, but one who can also, to a large extent, anticipate and respond to
what he thinks his audience’s needs, biases, perspectives, and stances will be.
In composition theory and pedagogy, we call such prose “reader-based,” as
opposed to “writer-based.” Inexperienced writers, Meyer and Smith explain,
often compose associatively, as if writing down their thoughts as they occur. They do not
communicate to a reader and are not conscious that their audience may not share the contexts or
assumptions underlying the sentences. These writers leave out crucial information, producing
prose that is elliptical or “writer-based,” as opposed to prose that is directed to a reader, or “readerbased.” (Meyer and Smith, 1987, p. 28)

One of the most challenging tasks for any writer, then, is communicating meanings by
anticipating contexts, assumptions, and—perhaps most importantly for the purposes of
this paper—counterarguments. (My own prolepsis: I am not suggesting that all writing,
or all good writing, is, by extension, a prolepsis. Anticipating and subsequently
responding to, rightly or wrongly, audience assumptions and larger contexts does not a
prolepsis make. But in my experience teaching college-level writing for 15+ years,
inculcating students’ abilities to anticipate and respond to the audience’s likely
counterarguments is a challenging but important task for the instructor. With almost
every sentence of this paper, I have asked myself, in one way or another, “What will my
intended audience members likely think of this? What objections, questions, or
assumptions might I be overlooking?” Anticipating all objections is not possible, of
course. The key is anticipating the most important ones, the most likely ones, and these
will almost certainly arise when my argument is at its weakest.)
In most writing situations (instance messaging comes to mind as a possible
exception), the audience is not immediately present: no body language cues can be seen
and interpreted; questions cannot be raised partway through the text. The reader can
certainly ask herself, “Now, what does he mean when he asserts . . . ?” but the reader
cannot ask the writer as the text unfolds or is (re)created in the reader’s mind.
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The problem of audience, especially as it relates to written discourse, is a
complicated issue, too. Many composition teachers and scholars recognize the potential
for at least two kinds of audiences, “audience addressed” and “audience invoked.” In the
first,
those who envision audience as addressed emphasize the concrete reality of the writer’s audience;
they also share the assumption that knowledge of this audience’s attitudes, beliefs, and
expectations is not only possible (via observation and analysis) but essential. (Ede and Lunsford
1987, p. 321)

“Know your audience” may be, generally speaking, good advice to a writer. It is,
nevertheless, often too simplistic to be of great value. (With this paper: I “know” my
audience will be primarily philosophers and other scholars and teachers of argument—
e.g., speech communication scholars, rhetorical theorists, etc.—but how well can I
“know” that audience? I have never met the vast majority of you, and it certainly is not
possible to locate and read all of your scholarship, for one, prior to my completion of this
paper.)
Ede and Lunsford identify the second approach to audience and its role in written
discourse as the “audience-invoked stance”:
those who envision audience as invoked stress that the audience of a written discourse is a
construction of the writer, a ‘created fiction.’ . . . They do not, of course, deny the physical reality
of readers, but they argue that writers simply cannot know this reality in the way that speakers can.
The central task of the writer, then, is not to analyze an audience and adapt discourse to meet its
needs. Rather, the writer uses the semantic and syntactic resources of language to provide cues for
the reader—cues which help to define the role or roles the writer wishes the reader to adopt in
responding to the text. (Ede and Lunsford 1987, p. 321)

One of the semantic and syntactic resources writers (and speakers, Ede and Lunsford
note) use to provide cues for their audiences is metaphor. They briefly examine a speech
by Jimmy Carter, a speech in which Carter explained to Americans that his program
against inflation was “the moral equivalent of warfare.” Using “warfare” as a metaphor to
define his policies, Carter was “doing more than merely characterizing his economic
policies.” He was also, Ede and Lunsford assert, “providing an important cue to his
audience concerning the role he wished them to adopt as listeners—that of a people
braced for a painful but necessary and justifiable battle” (p. 327). They add, further,
“were we to examine his speech in detail, we would find other, more subtle, but equally
important, semantic and syntactic signals to the audience” (p. 327). Although the Carter
example is a speech, Ede and Lunsford’s point about metaphor as a semantic and
syntactic resource used by the writer (or, there, the speaker) to help define the audience is
most germane to my purposes.
And like metaphor, prolepsis is, I conclude, one such semantic and syntactic
signal. When a language user—a writer or speaker—employs prolepsis, that language
user is not simply anticipating and responding to a counterargument before it has been
offered. More often than not, several other important language acts are concurrently
taking place: The language user is also framing the issue for or even with the audience;
employing the reciprocity rule; moving out of writer-based (or, speaker-based) prose and
moving toward reader-based (or, listener-based) prose; and, finally, employing a semantic
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and syntactic signal that tells the audience how the arguer wishes that audience to
respond to both the argument and the arguer. Are there prolepses that function as little
more than feints? Most certainly there are, but in most instances, the figure is a powerful
argumentation strategy, one that can bring language users together as they search for
“common ground.”
link to commentary
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